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Media Liability for Incitement and
True Threats under California
Abortion Provider Privacy Law
by ADITI MUKHERJI*
Introduction
Since the landmark decision in Roe v. Wade nearly forty years
ago, the polarizing issue of abortion remains at the forefront of
controversy on the American political scene.' With controversy often
comes violence. In the realm of antiabortion activity, several
abortion facilities have been blockaded to prevent women seeking
abortions from entering, while others have been bombed and burned.
Most recently, antiabortion activists have focused their attention on
abortion providers. In 2009, late-term abortion provider Dr. George
Tiller was murdered by Scott Roeder, a militant antiabortion activist,
while Dr. Tiller was working as an usher at Reformation Lutheran
Church.'
In an effort to keep in step with the radical antiabortion
movement's transition to the digital age, the California Legislature
enacted Chapter 3.25.4 The statute imposes civil penalties on any
person who posts specific personal information about abortion
providers or patients on the Internet with the intent to threaten or
incite violence against a provider or patient.! However, apart from its
second subdivision, Chapter 3.25 does not expressly confront the
issue of media liability under the statute. This Note, through an
* 2012 Juris Doctor Candidate at the University of California, Hastings College of
the Law; B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara.
1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Joe Stumpe & Monica Davey, Abortion Doctor Shot to Death in Kansas Church,
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2009, at Al.
3. Id.
4. Chapter 3.25, CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6218 (West 2011) [hereinafter Chapter 3.25].
5. Id.
[739]
example involving murdered abortion doctor George Tiller and cable
television personality Bill O'Reilly, explores the likely outcome of a
Chapter 3.25 dispute if a member of the press releases personal
information online about individual reproductive healthcare
providers or patients paired with radical antiabortion statements.
The discussion begins with a survey of the history of antiabortion
violence that precipitated the enactment of Chapter 3.25. To provide
context for press liability, the Note then traces the historically firm
First Amendment protection of the media in incitement and true
threats suits. The discussion then turns to analysis of a hypothetical
Chapter 3.25 dispute arising from actual statements made by Bill
O'Reilly about Dr. Tiller. The guiding legal framework throughout
the analysis is the seminal abortion violence case, Planned
Parenthood v. ACLA.' While significant parallels exist between
O'Reilly's statements and Planned Parenthood, O'Reilly's
statements-along with most members of the press-would likely fail
to invoke liability under Chapter 3.25. Instead, the most effective
solution is to work within the notion that the American media's usage
of extreme speech is regulated less by laws than by market factors and
evolving norms of civility."
I. A History of Violence
Activities targeting clinics and clinic employees have made
headlines in the news media for decades. Dr. David Gunn was
murdered in March 1993, and Dr. John Britton was killed in July
1994.9 Within a ten-day period in the fall of 1993, clinics in Illinois
and Pennsylvania were firebombed, and an arson fire "gutted" a
clinic in Bakersfield, California.10 The Pennsylvania clinic, a Planned
Parenthood facility, did not even offer abortion services, but rather
6. Although the goal of the Note is to explore the liability of the press under the
statute, relevant examples are drawn from cases about the media generally. It must also
be noted that this Note broaches but does not directly wrestle with the incredibly complex
issue of the Internet and how it is to be dealt with under the Luddite incitement and true
threats tests.
7. Planned Parenthood v. ACLA, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002).
8. EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 605 (Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds.,
2009). The term "evolving norms of civility" comes from Professor Robert Post, who used
it at the conference on which the volume is based ("Extreme Speech and Democracy,"
April 22, 2007) to describe one key aspect of the informal regulatory framework that
constrains the American media in the publication of extremist messages.
9. Stumpe & Davey, supra note 2.
10. Tamar Lewin, Clinic Firebombed in Pennsylvania, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, at
A16.
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offered only referrals and family planning." Between January and
September of 1993, there were nine attacks on clinics in the United
States, while dozens of clinics were attacked with butyric acid, 2 a
substance which gives off hazardous fumes." Some studies indicate
that the decade of the 1990s alone bore witness to over 1,000 violent
attacks against abortion providers and patients.1
The consequences of these violent attacks extend beyond
physical damage. Janet Benshoof, President of the Center for
Reproductive Law and Policy, explained, "Finding space for clinics
has always been hard, but it's gotten twice as hard. What landlord
wants to worry about firebombing, death threats and butyric acid?""
Some physicians, as a result of the unrelenting fearmongering of
16
extremists, have altogether given up providing abortion care.
In the wake of the bombings of clinics and the murders of Drs.
Britton, Gunn, and Tiller, physicians who perform abortions have had
to adapt to the risks. Dr. Frank Snydle of Central Florida Women's
Health Organization in Orlando carries a gun to work and wears a
bulletproof vest: "I am sick and tired of being terrorized every day of
my life for the last four years." 7 As Dr. Susan Wicklund, an abortion
provider who also carries a gun and wears a bulletproof vest to work
everyday, puts it, "it is absolutely absurd [that] I, as a physician in the
United States of America performing a legal procedure, have to go to
these measures to make it possible for me to go to work."18
11. Id.
12. Butyric acid is a clear, colorless liquid and gives off a rancid and vomit-like odor.
In early 1992, antiabortion extremists began to use butyric acid to prevent the use of
abortion facilities. Butyric acid was often a means to disrupt abortion services, close
clinics, and harass abortion care providers, staff, and patients. Depending on the amount
used and how it is introduced into the clinic, butyric acid can cause thousands of dollars of
damage, requiring clinics to replace carpeting, and furniture, and conduct extensive
cleanup of the facility. http://www.prochoice.org/about abortion/violence/butyric-acid.asp
(last visited Feb. 2, 2012).
13. Lewin, supra note 10.
14. Michael Wines, House Approves Measure on Anti-Abortion Attacks, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 19, 1993, at A16.
15. Lewin, supra note 10.
16. Michael Kirkland, Operation Rescue Says Clinic Blockades to Continue, UPI,
Nov. 19, 1993.
17. Lynne Bumpus-Hooper, Abortion Providers Seek More Protection: Clinic Owners
and Doctors Say Stronger Laws are Needed to Safeguard Them From Intimidation,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 19,1993, at B1.
18. Eryn Loeb, The Abortion Doctor, SALON, Jan. 22,2008.
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II. The Precursor to Chapter 3.25:
Planned Parenthood v. ACLA
Several doctors who were targets of antiabortion violence had
been previously identified on "unWANTED" posters produced by
the American Coalition of Life Activists ("ACLA").'9 The posters
said the doctors were "extremely dangerous to women and children"
and were "guilty" of "crimes against humanity."20 They offered
$5,000 rewards to people who assisted in ensuring the doctors "leave"
the profession.2 1 The ACLA's printed materials suggested that a
Mafia-type "contract" should be taken out on abortion providers
whose "crimes" were compared to the Nazi extermination of Jews
during World War 11.22 The ACLA Web site listed 200 "abortionists"
and approximately 200 other supporters of abortion.23 Color-coding
identified these individuals as "working," "wounded," or "fatality." 24
The three murdered doctors were listed with their names struck
through to identify them as fatalities.25
Four doctors whose names, addresses, and family member
information appeared on the Web site and the posters, sued under a
federal law that made it a crime to intentionally intimidate abortion
providers with a threat of force.26 The doctors claimed they feared for
their lives and were afraid to continue practicing medicine.27 A jury
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1063-66.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1065.
25. Id.
26. In response to the eruption of antiabortion violence, Congress enacted the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances ("FACE") Act in 1994. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1)
(West 2000). The FACE Act prohibits a person from using force or the threat of force to
prevent access to reproductive services and provides criminal and civil penalties for a
violation of the statute. See id. ("Whoever by force or threat of force or by physical
obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure,
intimidate or interfere with any person because that person is or has been, or in order to
intimidate such person or any other person or any class of persons from obtaining or
providing reproductive health services" may be subject to criminal and civil liability); see
also CAL. PENAL CODE § 423.2 (West Supp. 2007) (codifying California's version of the
FACE Act). Courts have interpreted "threat of force" in spirit with the true threats
doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000) ("[B]ecause
the First Amendment forbids the government from prohibiting speech that is merely
forceful or aggressive, conduct constitutes a 'threat of force' in violation of the FACE Act
only if it constitutes a 'true threat."').
27. Id.
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found the ACLA guilty of intentionally threatening to harm the
doctors as a means to stop them from providing legal medical
services)8 Thus, the United States District Court for the District of
Oregon entered judgment in favor of the abortion providers, and
granted a permanent injunction.29 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
initially upheld both the decision and a permanent injunction
preventing ACLA from publishing or posting threats against abortion
doctors.0 On appeal, Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit reversed
the ruling. Upon rehearing en banc, however, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals' Judge Rymer held that the actions of antiabortion
activist organizations in publicly disclosing names and addresses of
abortion providers constituted true "threats of force" within the
meaning of FACE, and thus were not protected under the First
Amendment.
III. Overview of Chapter 3.25
Chapter 3.25 aims to protect the online privacy of reproductive
healthcare providers, employees, volunteers, and patients.32 The
statute imposes civil liability for publicly posting on the Internet
specific personal information of protected individuals with the intent
to threaten them or incite third parties to harm them. Under the
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2251, at
4 (Apr. 18, 2006). ("Persons working in the reproductive health care field, specifically the
provision of terminating a pregnancy, are often subject to harassment, threats, and acts of
violence by persons or groups. In order to prevent potential acts of violence from being
committed against providers, employees, and volunteers who assist in the provision of
reproductive health care services and the patients seeking those services, it is necessary for
the Legislature to ensure that the home address information of these individuals is kept
confidential.") See also CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6254.21 (West 2010) (prohibiting the public
posting or displaying on the Internet of the home address or telephone number of an
elected or appointed official if that official has made a written demand that the
information not be disclosed).
33. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6218(a)(1) (West 2011) ("No person, business, or association
shall knowingly publicly post or publicly display on the Internet the home address, home
telephone number, or image of any provider, employee, volunteer, or patient of a
reproductive health services facility or other individuals residing at the same home address
with the intent to do either of the following: (A) Incite a third person to cause imminent
great bodily harm to the person identified in the posting or display, or to a coresident of
that person, where the third person is likely to commit this harm. (B) Threaten the person
identified in the posting or display, or a coresident of that person, in a manner that places
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California statute, individuals may make a "written demand for the
removal of certain personal information from the Internet."3 4
Additionally, this legislation imposes "civil liability upon any person
who solicits, sells, or trades this personal information with either the
intent to incite or the intent to threaten."3 1
A. Liability for Posting Personal Information
Under the first subdivision of Chapter 3.25, "an abortion service
provider, employee, volunteer, or patient of a reproductive health
services facility, or a person living in the same home with such person,
may bring an action for damages or injunctive relief if any person,
business, or association publicly posts on the Internet that individual's
home address, telephone number, or image with the intent set forth
by Chapter 3.25.",3' The first intent is the "intent to incite a third
person who is likely to cause immediate great bodily harm to a
[protected person]."3  The second intent is the intent to threaten a
protected person in such a way that the person is placed in
"objectively reasonable fear for his or her personal safety.""
Additionally, an interactive computer service or access software
provider may be liable under Chapter 3.25 where "the service or
provider intends to abet or cause bodily harm that is likely to occur or
threatens to cause bodily harm to a provider, employee, volunteer, or
patient of a reproductive health services facility" or any person living
in the same home with such person.3
A victim of a Chapter 3.25 violation may seek relief and
compensation in two ways.4 A victim may seek injunctive or
declaratory relief and, if a violation is found, the victim is entitled to
court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.41 The victim may also
bring an action for damages. 42 Additionally, if a violation is found, a
the person identified or the coresident in objectively reasonable fear for his or her
personal safety.").
34. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6218(b)(1) (West 2011).
35. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6218(c)(1) (West 2011).
36. See id.,§ 6218(a)(1); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6218(a)(2)(A)-(B) (West 2011).
37. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6218(a)(1).
38. Id.
39. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6218(d) (West 2011).
40. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 6218(a)(2)(A)-(B).
41. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6218(a)(2)(A) (West 2011).
42. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 6218(a)(2)(B) (West 2011).
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victim is entitled to a maximum amount of three times the actual
damages, but no less than $4,000.43
B. Demand for Removal of Personal Information Posted on the
Internet
Chapter 3.25's second subdivision prohibits a "person, business,
or association" from "publicly post[ing] . . . the home address or
home telephone number of any provider, employee, volunteer, or
patient of a reproductive health services facility if that individual has
made a written demand of that person, business, or association to not
disclose his or her home address or home telephone number." 4 The
demand requires a sworn statement that declares the person is
entitled to protection under the section and that describes a
reasonable fear for the safety of that person or another person living
in the same home based on a violation of the first subdivision of
Chapter 3.25.4 A demand is effective for four years.46 If a demand is
not honored and the information is made public, a person may seek
injunctive or declaratory relief.47 A person is entitled to court costs
and reasonable attorneys' fees if a violation is found.4 8  This
subdivision does not, however, extend liability to those employed in
connection with a newspaper, magazine, or other media
*49organizations.
C. Liability for Soliciting, Selling, or Trading Personal Information
The third subdivision of Chapter 3.25 mirrors the first but
addresses the issue of people who buy, sell, or trade personal
information over the Internet.5o It provides that "[n]o person,
business, or association shall solicit, sell, or trade on the Internet the
home address, home telephone number, or image of a provider,
employee, volunteer, or patient of a reproductive health services
43. Id.
44. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6218(b)(1) (West 2011).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6218(b)(2) (West 2011).
48. Id.
49. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6218(b)(3) (West 2011) ("This subdivision shall not
apply to a person or entity defined in Section 1070 of the Evidence Code."). See also CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 2011) (including people involved with "newspapers, magazines,
and other media organizations").
50. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6218(c)(1) (West 2011).
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facility" with either the intent to incite or the intent to threaten." If
personal information is solicited, sold, or traded, a victim may, in
addition to other legal rights or remedies available, bring an action
for damages.52 The measure of damages is the same as those in the
first subdivision."
IV. Brief Historical Background on the First Amendment and
Extreme Speech Made by the Press:
Near, Sullivan, and Brandenburg
In 1931, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Near v. Minnesota,
which invalidated a Minnesota statute that permitted a judge to block
the publication of a newspaper if the court found its content
"obscene, lewd and lascivious," or "malicious, scandalous and
defamatory."5 4 Writing for a majority of the Court, Chief Justice
Charles Evan Hughes found that prior restraints on the press are
presumptively unconstitutional, striking at the very core of the First
Amendment, and can be tolerated only in the most exceptional
cases-for example, to halt the publication of troop movements in
time of war." The decision reveals that the Supreme Court was
already accustomed to using the First Amendment as a profound
guardian for press freedoms.
More than thirty years later, the Supreme Court unanimously
decided New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, a libel case that declared
our "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."
Recognizing that "erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate,"
Justice William Brennan's opinion for the Court in Sullivan noted
that even false statements must be protected "if the freedoms of
expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need . . . to
survive.'
If Near "stiffened the backbone of countless editors and
publishers and helped stave off periodic attempts . . . to muzzle the
51. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 6218(c)(1)(A)-(B) (West 2011).
52. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6218(c)(2) (West 2011).
53. Id.
54. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 702 (1931).
55. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
675 (Kermit L. Hall et al., eds., 2d ed. 2005).
56. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
57. Id. at 271-72 (citation omitted).
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journalistic watchdog," Sullivan gave the media "breathing space"
to publish defamatory falsehoods.59 Near and Sullivan have come to
assure the American media that their stories cannot be enjoined-
except in the rarest of circumstances-and that subsequent
punishment for libel and related claims cannot be meted out except
upon clear and convincing proof of actual malice.'
In 1969, the Supreme Court decided a third case on the issue of
free speech, which would protect publication of speech that comes
breathtakingly close to incitement. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the
Court reviewed a conviction under an Ohio criminal syndicalism
statute.6 ' The case involved heated advocacy at a televised Ku Klux
Klan rally.62 After revisiting its fifty-year history of attempting to
construct a workable test to distinguish protected from unprotected
advocacy of illegal conduct, the Court adopted a two-pronged test.
Under the Brandenburg test, the Court permitted the punishment of
speech advocating illegal imminent lawless action that is likely to
incite or produce such action.63 In perfect step with Near and
Sullivan, Brandenburg reaffirmed the Court's firm protection of the
press and ushered in a high threshold to establish incitement by the
media.6
With Near, Sullivan, and Brandenburg, the Supreme Court
established a strong and lasting framework for the protection of
extreme speech enabled by the press in America. All three cases
involved speech that was in some sense extreme, or at least offensive
58. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 55, at 675.
59. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 148 (1967) (citation omitted).
60. By 1971, Near's rejection of prior restraints had become bedrock First
Amendment law in the United States. Hence, when the Nixon administration sought to
enjoin the New York Times from publishing a classified document on the history of
America's involvement in the Vietnam War, the Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision,
found that the government had failed to meet its heavy burden of proving a need for prior
restraint. Three justices dissented, objecting to the rush of the proceedings. In a separate
concurring opinion, Justice Byron White emphasized that publishers could be prosecuted
for criminal violations of national security laws regulating the dissemination of classified
information, but only after publication. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713, 733 (1971). In dissent, Chief Justice Warren Burger expressed his "general
agreement" with Justice White's views on the availability of "'penal sanctions"' for
possession or dissemination of documents or information relating to national defense. Id.
at 752.
61. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
64. Id.
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to a community with power to suppress it. Near invalidated a judge's
attempt to enjoin rabid, anti-Semitic remarks in the Saturday Press, a
weekly newspaper.65 Though Near was "an unsavory character-anti-
Catholic, anti-Semitic, anti-black, and anti-labor"-the Court
overturned an arguably well-intentioned law (and reversed the judge
who sought to apply it) on First Amendment grounds.6 The Sullivan
case focused on false and defamatory statements contained in a paid
advertisement titled "Heed Their Rising Voices," a fundraising
solicitation for the defense of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and the
Struggle for Freedom in the South. 67  Brandenburg reversed the
conviction of a man who had advocated violence at a Ku Klux Klan
rally." In these cases, "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" 69 speech
was given wide berth-wide enough to withstand the state's attempts
to enjoin publication, collect money damages, and imprison someone
for deeply offensive speech.
V. The Hypothetical Chapter 3.25 Dispute
In the case of murdered abortion doctor, George Tiller, Fox
News personality Bill O'Reilly "put Tiller in the public eye, and
help[ed] make him the focus of a movement with a history of violence
against exactly these kinds of targets"-"including Tiller himself, who
had already been shot" once before.o Tiller's name first appeared on
O'Reilly's show, "The Factor,"" on February 25, 2005.72 "Since then,
O'Reilly ... brought up the doctor on 28 more episodes," and as late
as April 27, 2009," almost exactly one month before Dr. Tiller was
murdered.74 O'Reilly repeatedly referred to the doctor as "Tiller the
Baby Killer" and said on June 12, 2007, "[I]f the state of Kansas
doesn't stop this man, then anybody who prevents that from
happening has blood on their hands as [Governor Sebelius] does right
65. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 697 (1931).
66. See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 55, at 675.
67. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256-59 (1964). See also TAYLOR
BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63 288-89 (1988).
68. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444.
69. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
70. Gabriel Winant, O'Reilly's campaign against murdered doctor, SALON (May 31,
2009, 4:32 PM), http://www.salon.com/2009/05/31/tiller 2/singleton.
71. The show was also available for viewing online.
72. Winant, supra note 70.
73. Id.
74. Id. George Tiller was murdered on May 31, 2009. Id.
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now."" "Three days later, he added, 'No question Dr. Tiller has
blood on his hands . . . I wouldn't want to be these people if there is a
Judgment Day . .. Kansas is a great state, but this is a disgrace upon
everyone who lives in Kansas. Is it not?' 76 O'Reilly said "[Tihe
sophisticates have shielded Tiller from the appropriate, legal
consequences of his deeds."" Most important for the purposes of
Chapter 3.25, O'Reilly showed Tiller's face and place of work on
"The Factor." Producer Porter Barry conducted an ambush interview
with Tiller at his place of work, which made Tiller and his place of
work recognizable to the viewers. The question then turns on
whether O'Reilly's statements and release of Tiller's personal
information-namely, his face and place of work-meet the requisite
incitement or true threats standards to invoke liability under Chapter
3.25.
VI. The Incitement and True Threats Standards
A. Incitement
Brandenburg seems to suggest that even if the press technically is
included in the reach of Chapter 3.25, it would be very difficult for a
media defendant to meet the requisite standard of incitement to
invoke liability under the statute. With rare exceptions, courts have
not found that a mass media defendant incited physical injury.79 To
convince the courts that a member of the media is guilty of inciting
violence against abortion providers or patients, the plaintiff must
prove the media defendant intentionally advocated illegal imminent
lawless action that is likely to incite or produce such action.?
1. Imminent Lawless Action
The incitement test requires a plaintiff to show that media
content would result in violent or unlawful activity immediately after
the criminal is exposed to it. When the suspect content is posted
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. The Cajun Boy, Bill O'Reilly's Holy War Against George Tiller, GAWKER (May
31, 2009, 10:16 PM), http://gawker.com/5273612/bill-oreillys-holy-war-against-george-tiller.
79. David A. Anderson, Incitement and Tort Law, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 957, 984
(2002).
80. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
81. Id.
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through the media, such a requirement is nearly impossible to prove
in court. The difficulty of the immanency threshold keeps in step
with the Brandenburg principle that speech ought to be protected
unless the speaker so inflamed others that there was "no more time
for speech" but only violence.82 Media content does not ordinarily
provoke such an immediate response. After seeing, reading, or
hearing media content, there is still time for further deliberation
before taking action, even time to have someone else dissuade or
prevent a person from committing violent acts.
For example, after a young friend stabbed to death a thirteen-
year-old boy, the murdered child's mother sued the manufacturers of
"Mortal Kombat," a video game.83  The mother claimed the
murderer's addiction to the game made him believe he was one of the
game's characters, causing him to stab her son." Using the incitement
test, a federal district court said even if the game caused the boy's
death, the media defendant's advocacy of violence was no more than
urging illegal action at some indefinite future time." The incitement
test requires that the media content cause imminent lawless action-a
crime directly and immediately connected with the content. The lack
of immanency rendered the connection between "Mortal Kombat"
and her son's death too attenuated to prove incitement.
Similarly, in Planned Parenthood v. ACLA, the abortion doctors
did not even claim that ACLA's speech amounted to incitement
because the speech was found incapable of "producing imminent
lawless action."" ACLA "offered rewards to those who stopped the
doctors at 'some indefinite future time,' and the ambiguous message
was hardly what one would say to incite others to immediately break
the law." 7 The Court concluded, "incitement requires an immediacy
of action that simply does not exist here, which is doubtless why
plaintiffs did not premise their claims on an incitement theory."M
Thus, even if Bill O'Reilly's statements on "The Factor" were
made to cause George Tiller's death by the release of visual images of
Tiller's face and place of work along with statements advocating
82. Id.
83. Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D. Conn. 2002).
84. Id. at 168.
85. Id. at 170.
86. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
87. Planned Parenthood v. ACLA, 290 F.3d 1058, 1092 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Hess v.
Indiana, 414 U.S. 105,108 (1973)).
88. Id.
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violence, a court would almost certainly find that O'Reilly's actions
failed to provoke an immediate violent reaction against Tiller. It is
unlikely an individual would even be physically situated, let alone
inspired, to inflict harm on an abortion provider or patient
immediately after reading or hearing an incendiary press piece.
2. Likelihood of Lawless Acts
The incitement test also requires proof that it is likely the media
content will cause violence. 9 This is not the same as foreseeability.
For example, it may be foreseeable that a movie with violent scenes
will cause a deranged person to commit unlawful acts. But courts say
the determining factor is whether the movie is likely to cause a
reasonable person to act illegally."
One court held that a radio station's promotional campaign
inspired reasonable people to commit illegal acts.91 A Los Angeles
Top 40 station with a large teenage audience devised a promotional
campaign.92 Anyone finding the station's well-known DJ in a red car
would win a cash prize and be interviewed on the air. 93 Two teenagers
independently saw the DJ's car on a Los Angeles freeway and raced
to catch him.94 One of the teenagers forced a third car off the
highway, killing the driver." The driver's relatives sued the station.'
The family won at trial and the jury awarded $300,000 in damages.
On appeal, the California Supreme Court ruled that it was likely
the station's promotion would lead to physical injury or death.98 The
disc jockey testified he had seen certain cars following him from one
location to another." The court took this admission to mean the
station should have known that a teenager who missed winning the
money at one location would likely speed to the next." Under the
89. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 450.
90. Id.
91. Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40 (1975).
92. Id. at 43-44.
93. Id. at 44.
94. Id. at 45.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 46-47. The station staged the promotion in the summer when many
teenagers with cars were at home and bored. Additionally, the promotion offered money
and a bit of fame.
99. Id. at 47.
100. Id.
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"reasonable person" standard, speeding and reckless driving was
likely to result in death or serious injury.10
In Planned Parenthood, the Court held that ACLA's statements
failed to rise to the level of likely under the "reasonable person"
standard. 2 The Court held the statements were not in fact followed
by acts of violence which is important because had [the speech] been
followed by acts of violence, a substantial question would be
presented as to incitement, but "[w]hen such appeals do not incite
lawless action, they must be regarded as protected speech." 03
The "likelihood of violence" standard is tremendously difficult to
meet in the case of Bill O'Reilly's statements regarding George Tiller.
On the one hand, the likelihood of violence is high because of the
number of people O'Reilly's "The Factor" website reaches online. A
large and diverse audience of extreme media speech would yield an
array of reactions, a few of which may very well be violent, especially
given the history of violent acts inflicted upon abortion providers and
patients. But on the other hand, under the incitement test's
reasonable person standard, despite the number of people "The
Factor" reaches through its online stream, a reasonable person would
be unlikely to inflict violence upon a reproductive health care
provider or patient immediately after reading or hearing the media
content.
Moreover, given the judiciary's long history of press protection,"
O'Reilly's extreme speech is effectively presumed protected by the
First Amendment's freedom of the press. In order to preserve the
principle that debate on matters of public concern should be
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,"'05 establishing that violence is
likely to result from O'Reilly's speech becomes all the more crucial in
proving liability under Chapter 3.25. Thus, the immanency and
likelihood prongs of the incitement test, although protective of public
discourse, are obstacles for victims of radical antiabortion violence
who fear physical attacks instigated by members of the media.
101. Id. at 48.
102. Planned Parenthood v. ACLA, 290 F.3d 1058, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002).
103. Id. at 1095-96 (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928
(1982)).
104. See supra Part IV.
105. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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B. True Threats
The history of violence and atmosphere of intimidation
surrounding abortion providers and patients permits a Chapter 3.25
suit to explore true threats as an alternative to incitement. Media
liability under Chapter 3.25 is potentially more feasible under a true
threats claim in part because unlike an incitement analysis, judges
need not weigh immanency or go down the slippery slope of
probabilities-whether it was likely that violence would result."
Furthermore, unlike incitement, true threats require the targeting of a
specific victim which can be an individual or identifiable group.o
True threats include "statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals."",8
The true threats standard, like the incitement standard, encompasses
statements made with the intent to intimidate.'" In order to "protect
individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear
engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence will
occur," such statements are not shielded by the First Amendment.'
The speaker's intent to threaten the person itself suffices to meet the
definition and the speaker need not actually intend to carry out the
threat."'
The court must weigh two crucial factors in its determination of
whether a statement rises to the level of a true threat: The content of
the statement and context in which the statement was made.112 In
Virginia v. Black, the Supreme Court recognized that true threats
106. Jennifer Elrod, Expressive Activity, True Threats, and the First Amendment, 36
CONN. L. REV. 541, 564-74 (2004) (discussing the doctrinal distinction between incitement
and true threats).
107. Id.
108. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
109. Id. at 360 (explaining that intimidation is a type of threat not protected by the
First Amendment "where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with
the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death").
110. R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,388 (1992).
111. See United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 632-33 (9th Cir. 2005) (analyzing
Virginia v. Black and concluding that a majority of the Justices agreed that intent to
intimidate is necessary).
112. See Elrod, supra note 106, at 559-60 (acknowledging that the Supreme Court "did
not draw bright lines in terms of the true threat doctrine" and that content and context
"were central to the Court's analysis").
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contain a subjective element; the speaker must actually intend to
threaten the individual or group that the threat is directed toward."3
In Planned Parenthood,H4 the 6-5 majority of the Ninth Circuit,
sitting en banc, held that actions of a militant antiabortion activists
organization in publicly disclosing on posters and websites the names
and addresses of abortion providers amounted to true "threats of
force" and were unprotected by the First Amendment."' The Court
distinguished Brandenburg on the ground that the activists had
named individual abortion providers; here there was an implicit
threat to their life, as the defendants must have appreciated that other
named doctors on similar posters and sites had been killed."'
Like Planned Parenthood, Bill O'Reilly named an individual
abortion provider; his stories targeted Dr. Tiller. Since Dr. Tiller had
previously been shot by a radical antiabortion activist,"' one can
reasonably assume Tiller felt genuinely intimidated by the critical
television exposure. According to the goal of true threats liability and
the facts of Planned Parenthood, an argument could be made that
O'Reilly's statements should not be protected by the First
Amendment in order to protect Dr. Tiller from "the fear of violence,
from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that
the threatened violence will occur." 8
While the fear and sense of intimidation Tiller likely felt is of the
nature the true threats principle aims to target and prevent, the
standard's "intent to intimidate"119 requirement nevertheless shields
media members with a penchant for extreme speech, like Bill
113. After analyzing the Black decision the Ninth Circuit held that speech is only
unprotected as a true threat "upon proof that the speaker subjectively intended the speech
as a threat." Cassel, 408 F.3d at 633. The court recognized that this definition of true
threats was in tension with prior cases applying the Ninth Circuit's objective definition of
true threat. Id. The Ninth Circuit also recognized that no other circuit had addressed the
issue of whether Black requires a person to prove the defendant's intent. Id. at 634. But
see United States v. Stewart, 420 F.3d 1007, 1016-19 (9th Cir. 2005) (declining to decide
whether Black's subjective test or the Ninth Circuit's objective definition of true threats
applied to statutes that the Ninth Circuit previously held did not require proof of
subjective intent). See also Roger C. Hartley, Cross Burning-Hate Speech as Free Speech:
A Comment on Virginia v. Black, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 33 (2004) ("Black now confirms
that proof of specific intent (aim) must be proved also in threat cases.").
114. Planned Parenthood v. ACLA, 290 F.3d 1058, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002). See supra Part
II.
115. Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1085-86.
116. Id. at 1086.
117. See Winant, supra note 70and accompanying text.
118. R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
119. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
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O'Reilly, from true threats liability. Members of the press like Bill
O'Reilly can make the claim that there was no such intent to
intimidate, that the goal of the speech was to pique public discourse,
and that the content should be viewed in the context of the news
media engaging in a controversial topic of great public concern. The
splintered court in Planned Parenthood held that "statements ought
to be treated as hyperbole because of their political content."'20 For
this reason, a court would not find O'Reilly's incendiary statements to
be a true threat and instead would protect his "hyperbolic
vernacular" under the umbrella of First Amendment protection.12 1
C. A Recent Case Examining Incitement and True Threats with a News
Media Defendant: Citizen Publishing Co. v. Miller
A recent Arizona Supreme Court case provides a useful
panoramic view of media liability under the incitement and true
threats standards. The recent case Citizen Publishing Co. v. Miller
reviewed an incitement and true threats suit involving a news media
defendant, a group with a history of suffering acts of violence, and
extreme speech on an issue of public concern.'22 Although not
binding on California law, the case gives a fair idea of the liability that
a news media defendant would experience in an incitement or true
threats claim under Chapter 3.25, since Chapter 3.25 uses the same
standards for incitement and true threats.
The Arizona Supreme Court determined whether a newspaper's
online publication of extreme speech aimed at Muslims, a group that
after the September 11 attacks has faced numerous acts of violence,
could give rise to liability for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.2 3 The case involved a daily newspaper's publication of a
letter to the editor about the war in Iraq. The relevant part of the
letter stated:
We can stop the murders of American soldiers in Iraq by those
who seek revenge or to regain their power. Whenever there is
an assassination or another atrocity we should proceed to the
closest mosque and execute five of the first Muslims we
encounter.
120. Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1097. It is also important to note that the ruling
in Planned Parenthood could very well have gone the other way if the FACE Act had not
existed, and therefore must be held to its facts as a narrow ruling. See id.
121. Id.
122. Citizen Publ'g Co. v. Miller, 115 P.3d 107 (Ariz. 2005).
123. Id.
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After all this is a 'Holy War' and although such a procedure is
not fair or just, it might end the horror. Machiavelli was
correct. In war it is better to be feared than loved.124
Two Islamic-Americans brought the suit against the newspaper,
brazenly on behalf of all Islamic-Americans who live in the area
covered by the circulation of the Tucson Citizen, including the reach
of the Internet website published by the Tucson Citizen.'25
In a unanimous decision, the Arizona Supreme Court held that
the First Amendment absolutely protects newspapers from tort suits
involving speech on matters of public concern unless the plaintiff can
prove that the speech fits squarely into one of the few exceptional
categories recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court.'26 The Arizona
high court identified both incitement and true threats as possible
exceptions to the general rule of First Amendment protection of
political speech-and proceeded to reject both of them in the case at
hand.
First, the court analyzed a possible incitement exception under
the Brandenburg rule, but discarded it because the letter did not
advocate "imminent lawless action."1' Second, the court made short
shrift of plaintiffs' asserted application of the "fighting words"
doctrine.128 Under that doctrine, the First Amendment does not
protect words "which, by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an imminent breach of the peace."'29 Underscoring the
importance of context, the United States Supreme Court noted that
fighting words must be addressed to the target of the remarks, and
that the doctrine has generally been limited to "face-to-face"
interactions.' Finally, the Arizona court considered whether the
letter could constitute a true threat under precedent arising from a
case in which an anti-war protester was convicted for threatening the
President's life for exclaiming at an anti-war rally that "[i]f they ever
make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is
124. Id. at 109 (emphasis added). The author served as counsel to Citizen Publishing
Company and argued the case on March 24, 2005, to the Arizona Supreme Court.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 112-13 (emphasis added).
128. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
129. Id.
130. Id.
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L. B. J.".' In Watts v. United States, the Supreme Court distinguished
certain actionable threats from constitutionally protected speech,
found the defendant's remark to be a form of crude political
hyperbole, and reversed the conviction.'32 Following Watts and cases
decided thereafter, the Arizona Supreme Court emphasized that
context is essential.' Harkening back to Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes' famous line, the Court observed, "There is a vast
constitutional difference between falsely shouting fire in a crowded
theater and making precisely the same statement in a letter to the
editor."'34 It also found that "plainly political messages" are far less
likely to be true threats than statements directed "purely at other
individuals." 35
The Citizen Publishing case is emblematic of the judiciary's
anticipated deferential approach toward the media's use of extreme
speech. Rhetorically, the court described the language in the letter to
the editor as "no doubt reprehensible" and "offensive."' Still, the
Arizona Supreme Court recognized the fundamental importance of
protecting "the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public
interest and concern,"' and ordered dismissal of the lawsuit. 3 1
And yet, an argument could be made that the personal
information aspect of Chapter 3.25 distinguishes Bill O'Reilly's
statements from Citizen Publishing and aligns the statements more
with Planned Parenthood. Even if the speech itself is crude political
hyperbole, when it is coupled with the dissemination of personal
information-like images of the doctor and his workplace-the
speech ought to be stripped of protection as "most-likely-harmless
rhetoric" and deemed an unprotected threat. But again, given the
Court's firm protection of the press, it is unclear whether the personal
information slant could serve as a sufficient tipping point for the gavel
to fall on the other side. Although a media defendant would likely
escape liability given the strict standards for incitement and true
threats, it is not definitively predictable how a Chapter 3.25 suit
involving a media defendant would pan out.
131. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969).
132. Id.
133. Citizen Publ'g Co. v. Miller, 115 P.3d 107, 111 (Ariz. 2005).
134. Id. at 115.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 113.
137. Id. at 111 (quoting Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)).
138. Citizen, 115 P.3d at 115.
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VII. Solution: The Marketplace and
Evolving Norms of Civility
With uncertainty looming about press liability under Chapter
3.25, the question then becomes, how can press members like Bill
O'Reilly be held accountable for provoking readers to commit acts of
violence against abortion providers or patients? Put another way,
what can be done if courts refuse to depart from their unwavering
protection of the press, and consequently, press members almost
always fail to meet the requisite standard of incitement or a true
threat set forth in Chapter 3.25?
One potential solution is to recalibrate the Brandenburg and true
threats tests for members of partisan news media who repeatedly
produce violence-inducing content. Making the tests more malleable
to include a media defendant for valueless extreme rhetoric could
give the media an incentive to return to newsroom ethics policies-to
engage in vigorous discourse and deliberation, but to do so while
treating everyone, including targets of criticism, with common
standards of dignity. Such a system would not only raise the level of
discourse but also widen the exchange of information, which is the
very core of the press function. But the freedom of the press is so
vigilantly guarded by the judiciary, as exemplified by the Citizen
Publishing case, that courts would be vehemently opposed to
recalibrating the tests when applied to the media. Such a result would
also raise serious concerns about the judicial system's ability to
exercise a bias in silencing certain media outlets. Instead, to hold
members of the media accountable for provoking violence against
abortion providers and patients, a more effective solution would be
for the public to assume the role of the conscientious consumer and
vigilantly vocalize its disapproval of such incendiary remarks.
For practical reasons, "the American media's use of extreme
speech is regulated less by laws than by market factors and evolving
norms of civility."m9 In the name of survival in a dwindling industry,
media outlets increasingly use the bottom line to guide the pen. The
impulse to produce what sells is only exacerbated by the difficulties
traditional media outlets are currently facing in their transition to the
digital market. To many, the new media business model is a grim one
139. EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 605.
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as "Justice Holmes' notion of an exalted 'marketplace of ideas' has
become little more than the marketplace."l 40
Fortunately, the modern mainstream media's reservations about
written ethics guidelinesl4' have largely given way to thorough
newsroom policies. The shift towards stronger journalistic ethics
reveals that "when major media companies can pledge to treat people
with respect and compassion and to observe common standards of
dignity, they are doing as much to elevate the level of discourse-and
reduce the repetition of hate speech-as the dicta in any lengthy
judicial opinion."l 42
In April 2007, CBS Radio was confronted with a public outcry
against one of its most popular talk show personalities, Don Imus,
after the host used racially charged offensive speech on air.143 The
controversy faced by CBS demonstrates how mounting pressure by
the marketplace and evolving civility norms can be just as effective as
a law. During a game, Imus referred to the black female athletes on
Rutgers University's team as "nappy-headed ho's."l' Far from the
first time, Imus had hurled a slew of offensive terms such as "thieving
Jews," "faggots," and "Lesbos" on several prior occasions.14 The
public-in addition to network employees, civil right leaders, and
advertisers-called on CBS to fire Imus.'" Soon thereafter, the
popular "Imus in the Morning" was cancelled.'47 By comparison, legal
recourse for the action was tepid: litigation involved only breach of
140. Id. at 606 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (dissenting
opinion)) ("[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,
and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely cane be carried out. That,
at any rate, is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an
experiment.").
141. The fear of written guidelines may have been due to evidentiary concerns about
the use of internal ethics standards against media defendants in a breach of privacy or libel
suit. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. (citing David Carr, Networks Condemn Remarks by Imus, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7,
2007), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9AO7E4D8173FF934A35757COA96
19C8B63&pagewanted=all; Andrea Peyser, Ugly "Diss" Jockey Can Take the Unfunny
and Run, N.Y. POST (Aug. 15, 2007), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/item_42id0lHOntb
XLBtB0f32LJ).
146. EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 606.
147. Id.
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contract claims. Particularly noteworthy, the Federal Communications
Commission, by definition, could not brand Imus' offensive speech as
"indecent." 48
From fired to hired, the fact that Imus could soon thereafter land
a show on another network further demonstrates how balanced the
marketplace and evolving civility norms are. As the Supreme Court
said nearly 60 years ago, reversing a conviction for breach of peace,
"a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite
dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are,
or even stirs people to anger." 49
Conclusion
Courts must protect the freedom of the press, for it is a
cornerstone of democracy. Yet it is equally imperative for courts to
hold serious threats and verbal conspiracies unprotected by freedom
of speech because they fail to make a contribution to the public
discourse, which is the very core of a participatory democracy The
difficulty rests between emotionally charged hyperbolic language and
a true threat that instills within its victims a genuine fear for their
personal safety. But generally the context of the speech will reveal on
which side of the line it falls: Factors such as the language used, the
primary audience addressed, and the position of the speaker with
regard to that audience are all relevant. It was relevant in the United
States v. Rahman case,5 o for example, that a preacher urging
assassinations had the power to dispense fatwas, so it was hard to
characterize these urgings as mere persuasion. In contrast, a general
encouragement of terrorism, including assassination of political
leaders, where no immediate acts are incited, should be regarded as a
contribution to political or public discourse, and so falls under a
148. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (holding an indecent broadcast as one
that includes "language or material that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium,
sexual, or excretory organs or activities").
149. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
150. United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999). The defendants had been
convicted of conspiracy and other offenses for plotting to bomb office buildings and to
assassinate the President of Egypt and Rabbi Meir Kahane, a prominent extreme Zionist.
The leading defendant, Abdel Rahman, a Muslim preacher, was not immune from
prosecution because he participated in the conspiracy "through the medium of political
speech or religious preaching." Id. at 117.
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freedom of speech or expression principle. That at least is what
Brandenburg and later jurisprudence suggests.
However, the effect of the Brandenburg test-when coupled with
the judiciary's long history of protecting the press"' in order to
preserve open debate on matters of public concern-is that the
immediacy and likelihood of violence prongs will almost always weigh
in the press's favor, which creates a gaping hole in protection for
abortion providers like George Tiller. As a result, the predictability
of the protection gives members of the press like Bill O'Reilly free
rein to make radical statements with no substantive checks for third
party violence in place. So long as the words are shy of an explicit
true threat against someone,'52 the press is shielded from liability for
any extreme speech, even if the speech is about a specific individual
like an abortion doctor, who is part of a group vulnerable to violence.
For the past half century, the Court has built strong judicial ramparts
to protect the press from legal claims over various kinds of extreme
speech with no sign of change otherwise.'
At the same time, the press is growing increasingly dependent on
public approval for its survival in the marketplace. The marketplace,
as CBS and Don Imus discovered, is controlled by an array of factors,
including the public's desire for ethical journalism.'54 Indeed, the
tension between for-profit civility and for-profit crudity is a valuable
mechanism for curbing extreme speech.'" Despite its imperfections,
the marketplace "complements and informs the judicial protections
that the American media enjoys."5 6
Although the press may very well escape the grasp of Chapter
3.25, all hope for a shift in journalism is not lost. So long as an
informed public exists with a palate for human decency, the press can
serve as a powerful tool to lift speech from violent hatemongering.
For "liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there,
no constitution, no law, no court can save it.""'
151. See supra Part IV.
152. In Planned Parenthood, the hit list sufficed as an explicit threat. Planned
Parenthood v. ACLA, 290 F.3d 1058,1066 (9th Cir. 2002).
153. See supra Part IV.
154. EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 607.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
LEARNED HAND 189-90 (3d ed. 1960).
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